believe that Justice White's approach to constitutional adjudication neither disqualifies him for the adjective "great" nor establishes a lack of "constitutional isi ion."^ On the contrary, his constant and committed dedication to nonideological case-by-case adjudication, in the grand common law tradition of American constitutional law, both secures his claim to greatness and evidences his over-arching constitutional vision.
I t is an article of faith among many that an absolute prerequisite to judicial greatness is a firm commitment to a "persuasive judicial phil~sophy."~ And not only must truly great jurists have a persuasive philosophy (meaning, we suppose, a personal commitment to pre-conceived notions of liberty, fairness andlor justice), they must be able to "project their philosophy from case to case."6 The Justices of the United States Supreme Court-so this line of reasoning goes-fill a role more exalted than merely interpreting a written Constitution: they are judicial policymakers who bring the Constitution into "existence" when they make "hard" decisions (supposedly) too intense for mere politics.' It would follow that their philosophy must be not only "persuasive" but also "pervasive."
According to these theorists, democracy has beconie too inefficient to deal with modern problems. Ordinary politics has resulted in a stifling "pluralism'" that prevents progress and thwarts development of important rights. Thus, to remedy the perceived "shortcomings of pluralism," some have called upon the Justices of the Supreme Court to hammer out a new "Constitution of Contr01."~ The Justices, these commentators seem to assert, must assume the status of social diagnosticians, ascertaining society's ills and then concocting and measuring out the needed constitutional elixir-no matter how unwilling to swallow their medicine the general populace may be.'' Such views are provocative and-to judge from discussions in the popular press regarding the importance of the personal views of judicial nominees"-rather widely accepted (even if the full ramifications of this acceptance are not fully understood). We believe, however, that the proper role of a judge is not quite as exalted as the foregoing discussion would suggest. The conscious development of policy over time through the exercise of one's office is a function that is normally, and quite properly, associated with the representative-and politically accountable-branches of government. The role of the judge, by contrast, should be to decide discrete cases. 12 That role, of course, will often raise policy questions. In deciding cases, a judge must "interpret[] the laws passed by the legislature and the regulations issued by executive agencies, and monitor[] the conduct of government agencies, public institutions, and even private individuals and groups in the light of the Constit~tion."'~ At times, because of statutory or 8 . Id. at 270-71. 9. Id. 10 . But see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2884 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[Tlhe notion that the Court must adhere to a decision for as long as the decision faces 'great opposition' and the Court is 'under fire' acquires a character of almost czarist arrogance.") 11. See, e.g., Max Boot, Ginsburg Hearings Provide Some Insight into Judge's Ideals, CHRISTIAN 12. A federal appellate judge once noted that "[tlhe function of the judge is of a quite different order from the functions of the legislator and administrator. The judge has the ancient task of settling disputes between specific individuals, groups, or institutions-a field we could call private law." FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH 9 (1980). 13. Id.
constitutional ambiguity, this interpretive task will inevitably involve resolution of policy disputes. But while judges unquestionably grapple with policy, they do it in the context of discrete cases. It follows, we believe, that the only legitimate way that policy should result from judicial minds and pens is through the exercise of case-by-case, decisional authority. Policy development should not be the primary judicial objective. On the contrary, the judge's for&g of policy should be incidental to the decision of actual cases, progressing only as necessity and experience mandate.14 Some who adhere to a more sweeping conception of the judicial role have lamented Byron R. White's purported lack of "vision" on the Court.15 We believe, however, that this criticism-with its concomitant emphasis on personal philosophy-is seriously flawed. A judge is not (or a t least should not be) a policy czar who marks the boundaries of the Constitution by the light of a n unknown (and perhaps unknowable) inner vision. Rather, a judge (and especially a Justice of the Supreme Court) decides discrete controversies and sets policy only in the context of interpreting written law-i.e., statutes and the Constitution. And evaluated by that standard, Justice White belongs with the best? Undoubtedly, Bryon R. White has been something of a judicial enigma.
14. As Justice Felix Frankfurter has noted, [Ilt is not the business of this Court to pronounce policy. It must observe a fastidious regard for limitations on its own power, and this precludes the Court's giving effect to its own notions of what is wise or politic. That self-restraint is of the essence in the observance of the judicial oath, for the Constitution has not authorized the judges to sit in judgment on The inability of journalists and scholars to pin an appropriate label on Justice White has generated much of the criticism thrown his way.18 Indeed, some of Justice White's harshest criticslg cite as Exhibit 1 for their case-in-chief his propensity to "decide[] cases and no Others, moving from the same starting point, have asserted that his jurisprudence lacks "~onsistency."~~ These purported "defects," some have argued, evidence a n overall lack of judicial greatne~s.~' We believe these complaints not only reach the wrong conclusion, but establish the basis for exactly the opposite conclusion.
To begin, there is a decent argument that-if one takes into account not only the quality but also the breadth of his accomplishments-the most accomplished person to come out of the American twentieth century is Byron R. White. In sports, he was an All-American and professional football player:3 REHNQUIST, THE known to many as "Whizzer White."24 In law school, he was a n editor of the Yale Law Journal. In practice, he was a partner in one of Denver's most prestigious firms. In the executive branch of the federal government, he occupied one of the most significant positions: Deputy Attorney General. And in the judicial branch, he held one of the most important posts for thirty-one years, the ninth longest tenure in the history of the C o~r t . '~ In short, even though the twentieth century may have produced better athletes, a few (but only a few) lawyers and top Justice Department officials who were in his class, and several Supreme Court Justices who were as good (though, for reasons discussed below, very few), perhaps no one in this century has excelled across such a broad range of accomplishments as has Byron R. White 24. Justice White, to our knowledge, has not wanted people to call him "Whizzer," perhaps because he does not want to be remembered principally as a football player. The one possible exception seems to consist of athletes with whom or against whom he has competed. Once when he visited the Brigham Young University Law School in the late 1970s, Justice White was joined for d i~e r by "Hack" Miller, a news reporter for the Deseret News, who in his college playing days a t the University of Utah had competed against the Justice in basketball. As the evening progressed, Justice White seemed not to mind-and to even enjoy-being addressed as "Whizzer" by ''Hack. ' plainly one of the greats. He is a man who is interested in almost everything, whether legal issues or others, and his mind is capable of reaching almost as much as his interest. Over the decades, law clerks consistently observed that he always managed to stay several steps ahead of their efforts. His reputation among Supreme Court practitioners as a relentless and difficult questioner is well deserved, mainly because he was consistently so well prepared and had thought through the difficult issues with such thoroughness and care that he was always able, and usually willing, to challenge even the most sophisticated argument made by counsel.z8
With such a background, the complaint that Justice White has failed to articulate an overarching "judicial philos~phy"~~ and has, instead, "decide[d] cases and no more"30 is hardly damning. Rather, his non-ideological approach to deciding cases has been the fountain of his strength.
One of Byron White's greatest strengths has been his acute awareness of the respective competencies of the legislative and judicial branche~.~' Indeed, at his confirmation hearing, he testified that the 'legislative power is not vested in the Supreme Court," and he asserted that the "major instrument for changing the laws in this country is the Congress of the United state^."^' This fundamental commitment to a limited judicial role is the foundation for the Justice's "preference for case-by-case adjudication," as well as for his "'aversion to large statements, to assertions of oveniding philo~ophy."'~~ asserted that a judge passing on a constitutional question must "have at least a bowing acquaintance with Acton and Maitland, with Thucydides, Gibbon and Carlyle, with Homer, Dante, Shakespeare and Milton, with Machiavelli, Montaigne and Rabelais, with Plato, Bacon, Hume and Kant," LEARNED HAND, THE To be sure, by the time of his retirement, after more than three decades of deciding cases, we know his views on abortion,34 the three-part ern on^^ test for deciding establishment of religion Miranda u. Arizona3' and its c o r r e c t n e s~,~~ and other important constitutional and law enforcement issues. But this has come about not because he characterized himself as a "liberal" or "conservative," and then did his judging consistent with what a good liberal or good conservative would be expected to do, or because in any other respect he started from some pre-determined policy position. Rather, Justice White's views have evolved over time as he has exercised the only authority that the Constitution vests in Article I11 judges: to decide cases and controversies.
Because While no definitive answer (short of candid disclosure by Justice White himself) can be given, there is one likely possibility. At the time he wrote the opinion in Lamb's Chapel, Justice White knew he would be leaving the Court. He was also aware that, while he and four other members of the thencurrent Court disapproved of Lemon, the case had not lost the support of perhaps as many a s four other sitting Justices.43 Justice White, moreover, did not know whether his replacement on the Court would support (or disapprove of) Lemon. Accordingly, if he wrote an opinion reversing Lemon i n Lamb's Chapel, he might be discarding a precedent that-in the near future-could again have the support of a majority of the Court.
In such circumstances, it is quite possible that Justice White simply determined that he would leave the fate of Lemon to his successor. He would not, in short, force his personal views upon the United States Constitution as a matter of individual will. If this plausible explanation for Justice White's refusal to make "Lemonade" in Lamb's Chapel is accurate, it is yet another indication of the Justice's careful-and laudable-decisionmaking style.
This measured approach to the judicial role has not resulted-as some have charged-in a jurisprudence that lacks "con~istency."~~ It has become almost commonplace for certain commentators to claim that Justice White, a supposed "liberal" a t the time of his appointment, has often joined "conservative" opinions.45 Building upon this observation, others have argued 43 . See Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2150 (Scalia, J., concurring) (counting the votes a g a i n s t a n d , inferentially for-lemon).
44. E.g., Rosen, supra note 3, a t 25 (asserting that Justice White somehow "relish[es] his inconsistencies").
45. E.g., Fred L. Israel, Bryon R. White White is "[olrdinarily conservative"). The utility of such observations is questionable. See COFFIN, supra note 12, at 201 ("All that I think can be justly said about the utility of applying overworked labels to judges is that they are appropriate to some judges on some issues some of the time. But to use them as that the Justice has reached "inconsistent" results in individual cases.46 In our view, Byron White has been mercurial neither in his philosophy nor in his results.
As an initial matter, it is far from clear that Byron White has, in fact, deviated much from the supposed liberalism of the man who appointed him: John F. Kennedy. One can question, for example, whether JFK himself was really as liberal as most people assu~ne.~' Indeed, Justice White's jurisprudence has been described as a snapshot of the Kennedy era: "pro-labor, pro-civil rights (but not affirmative action), strong on national security and very anti-crime."48 If this description is accurate (as we believe it is), Byron White's supposed conservatism may result more fkom shifts in the liberal agenda than from any discernable movement on the part of the Justice himself.49
The conjectured conservatism of Justice White, in any event, is hardly apparent from a candid review of his voting record. His votes implicating racial or sexual preference^,^' school desegregation5' and other discrimination cases52 (as will be discussed below)53 are neither "liberal" nor "conservative." To be sure, his performance in such public attention-catching areas as abortion,54 law enf~rcernent,'~ generic descriptions characterizing judges on supposedly major points of difference exaggerates the extent to which they may fairly apply.").
46. (White, ~o d o r n y~~ church-state relationships,s7 and pornography5' could be called "conservative" by a traditional pigeonholer. On the other hand, however, if that same pigeonholer looks to cases involving the powers of state and local governments vis-hvis the federal governmentF9 federal regulatory authority in general (including a n t i t r~s t ) ,~' labor and securities issues,6l J., dissenting from holding that right to counsel attaches when police investigation focuses on a particular suspect in police custody and that statements made after suspect has been denied access to counsel are inadmissible against suspect); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. or the powers of Congress v i s -h i s those of the P r e~i d e n t ,~~ then he belongs in the "liberal" box. Byron R. White, in sum, has been neither liberal nor conservative. He has been the proverbial "man in the Some might (and, indeed, have) looked at this record and asserted that Justice White has lacked "consistency" in deciding cases.64 On that issue, we ask, consistency with what? Precisely because the job of the Article I11 judge is to decide cases and controversies, it would be a mistake for a federal judge to fit himself or herself into a liberal or conservative slot and then decide cases on that basis. The consistency that really counts is consistency with Article I11 obligations, and not consistent performance as an ideologue. And on this score, no one has evidenced more consistent devotion to the careful, non-ideological decision of individual cases than has Byron White.
A sampling of Justice White's views regarding constitutional and legislative prohibitions on racial discrimination is illustrative. Early in his career, he joined opinions which read the Fourteenth Amendment broadly to prohibit state practices (such as poll taxes) that limited access to the voting booth.65 He also joined opinions which greatly expanded congressional authority to regulate private, invidious dis~rimination~~ and recognized Congress' plenary power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause.67 Nevertheless, Justice White also wrote the Court's opinion in Washington v. Davis,G8 which limited the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment to "purposeful" discrimination, and joined the opinion in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson CO.,~' which subjected a municipal ordinance affording class-based relief to minority businesses to "strict scrutiny."
Are these positions consistent? Why would a Justice who voted to strike down a poll tax thereafter conclude that the Equal Protection Clause reaches only "purposeful" discrimination? Why would a Justice who would accord Congress substantial latitude in remedying racial discrimination nevertheless subject state-created class-based remedies to strict scrutiny? Are these results, as some have charged, merely the result of an ad hoc approach to the decision of constitutional questions that is pragmatic but ultimately unsound? We believe that there are plausible answers to these (and similar) queries, and that the decisions noted above are not only consistent, but display a clear judicial (and constitutional) vision. Justice White's voting record--from invalidating the poll tax7' to Washington v. Davis-is consistent with the central command of the Equal Protection Clause: no "person" shall be denied "the equal protection of the law^."^' Indeed, if proof of a disproportionate impacti.e., the fact that a regulatory scheme bears more heavily upon blacks than whites, or upon males than females-were sufficient to establish a constitutional violation, the focus of the Equal Protection Clause would undergo a dramatic shift. "The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race," wrote Justice ~h i t e . '~ But if disproportionate impact alone established a constitutional violation, government could never act without acting on the basis of race. Virtually every governmental decision-from taxation, to zoning, to usury rates-would become enmeshed in racial politics, resulting in a shift in focus from constitutional protection of the "person" to protection of the person's "class."73 In short, the jurisprudence of the man whose work we examine here demonstrates profound respect for (and consistency in adjudicating) the equal protection claims of i n d i~i d u a l s .~~ There is, furthermore, no inconsistency between the Justice White who would accord Congress substantial latitude to enforce the Fourteenth A m e n d~n e n t~~ and the Justice White who would subject state-created racial classifications to strict scrutiny.76 Nothing in Croson cuts back on congressional authority to implement class-based remedies. Indeed, one year after joining Croson, Justice White joined the majority opinion in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. u. FCC,?? in which the Court held that class-based remedies enacted by Congress need not pass strict scrutiny but, instead, will be tested under a substantially more deferential standard of reviewe7' Justice White's a p p a r e n t conclusion, i.e., t h a t state-created racial 73 . See, e.g., id. a t 248.
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white. Id.
74. E.g., SAVAGE, supra note 17, at 218. Almost alone among the justices, [Byron White] could claim a record of consistency on the issue of racial discrimination. When confronted in the 1960s and 1970s with cases where blacks had suffered racial discrimination, White sided with them. This put him in the liberal camp, a t least on civil rights. However, in the 1980s, when whites came to the Court with evidence that they had suffered racial discrimination, he sided with them, too. 78. Under Croson, municipal class-based remedies must be necessary to further a compelling governmental interest. 488 U.S. at 498-506. Under Metro, however, congressionally enacted class-based remedies will pass constitutional muster so long as they are substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental purpose. 497 U.S. a t 565-66. ~l a s s~c a t i o n s are highly suspicious and therefore require rigorous justifi~ation'~ while similar federal actions do not, is hardly "inconsistent" or "unprincipled." On the contrary, it represents the modern embodiment of federal theory reaching back at least as far as The Federalist Papers: political action at the national level is less subject to abuse than similar action at the local level." Justice White, finally, has refrained from inflexible, doctrinaire stands on the issues raised by the foregoing cases. While he insists upon proof of "purposeful" discrimination, he will accept-as indicative of "purpose"--evidence that some members of the Court have suggested amounts to little more than a disguised "disproportionate impact" analy~is.~' Justice White's record, in short, confirms the observation of one of his former clerks that he is "'a lawyer's lawyer, and . . . sees the cases as law cases, not as matters of social poli~y.""~ The results capsulized above are not the result of accident, nor do they evidence a lack of vision or consistency.83 On the contrary, they confirm that Byron White is perhaps the most consistent member of the Supreme Court in the only respect in which consistency really matters: fidelity to the constitutional duty t o decide individual cases in accordance with the facts and applicable law. Presented with discrete controversies, Justice White has concluded that there are limits beyond which the Fourteenth Amendment may come to protect a "class" rather than a "person," and that there is a difference between 79. See, e.g., Croson, 488 US. at 495-96 (noting that the class-based preference invalidated in Croson was adopted by a city council composed predominantly of minorities).
80. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 324 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that the size of the federal government "will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable"); THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82-84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression.").
81 We have attempted to establish two points. First, there is a disparity of views regarding the role of a Supreme Court Justice: while some would have the Justices establish broad social policy in the context of construing the Con~titution,8~ others (including ourselves) would limit the Justices rather closely t o the decision of discrete cases, indulging in judicial policymaking only to the extent absolutely necessary (and even then only in the light of established statutory and constitutional policies). Our view is bottomed on the Constitution itself. Article I11 authorizes the members of the " l e a s t dangerousms5 b r a n c h t o decide "cases or contro~ersies."~ Strangely enough, Article I vests "all legislative Powersms7 somewhere else. Second, Justice White has quite clearly eschewed the role of social policymaker: he has declined the crown of philosopher king and, instead, has rather doggedly decided individual cases on their distinct records.
These two points raise the ultimate question: Is he great? The answer to this query, of course, depends to some extent upon the ideology of the respondent. For those who have adopted the model of the Supreme Court Justice as a social engineer, a truly great Justice must be a true visionary. Because (under this view) the Justices "make up the law as they go along, in accordance with their personal predilection^,"^^ the individual jurist must have fairly lofty predilections or all (including the Constitution) is lost. "Persuasive judicial philosophy"sg and "vi~ion'"~ are all important; without such virtues, not only would a Justice of the Supreme Court lack greatness, the Nation would run the risk of losing justice (with a small "j") itself. Accordingly, those who adhere to this conception of justice and Justices may well be somewhat dismissive of Byron R. White; after all, he "decides cases and no more."g1 We take a contrary view because we believe that a great Supreme Court Justice should-first and foremost-decide cases. Indeed, transforming the Justices of the Supreme Court into visionary constitutional diagnosticians and social engineers poses a t least three significant risks for a democratic society.
The first risk is that the fact-finding capabilities of judges may be limited; they must "make policy" (to the extent they "make policy") in the context of facts presented, organized (and sometimes created) by legal counsel in a discrete case. Legislators, by contrast, are limited neither by Article III's case-or-controversy req~irement,'~ nor by the decision of legal counsel to construct the record in a particular way.93 The legislator not only is free to inquire into any relevant facts, but also c a n carry t h a t i n q u i r y wherever t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t r a t h e r than the interests of private litigants-might indicate.
The second risk raised by broad judicial policymaking is lack of accountability. A major difference between the judiciary and the legislature is that legislators must periodically account to the people for the way they have carried out their public 91. SAVAGE, supra note 17, at 93. 92. Indeed, the judicial authority granted in Article I11 is limited, by its own terms, to deciding cases and controversies. US. CONST. art. 111, $ 2.
93. Litigation records, particularly in public interest lawsuits, are often engineered by counsel. For example, in recent litigation involving a Utah abortion statute, counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union-hoping to bring an "as applied" challenge to an 18-year-old spousal-notification statute-advertised for potential plaintiffs in four states. Despite intensive effort, the attorneys were unable to uncover a single individual who could complain about the past administration of the statute. Without a concrete complainant, legal counsel were forced to bring a facial challenge to the statute, arguing what "might" occur under the statute rather than what "had" occurred during the past 18 years. See Brief for the Defendants-Appellees at 5, Jane L. v. Bangerter, No. 93-4145 (10th Cir.
filed Aug. 2, 1993). As a result, the constitutionality of the spousal-notification provision was determined-not on the basis of actual experiencebut on the basis of expert opinion regarding what "could" happen, even though there was no evidence that it "had" happened. Such a "record" may be firm ground for legislative policymaking; it is a rather unstable foundation for judicial pronouncement.
responsibilities. The absence of judicial accountability makes judicial policymaking a decidedly problematic endeavor.
By definition, "policy" involves issues that affect people, and peoples' views regarding those effects may differ mightily. The resulting disparity of views may render the legislative process difficult-sometimes, exceedingly difficult. In fact, commentators who argue for an expansive judicial role assert that such a role is necessary precisely because political choices are "hard."g4 But just because a decision is "hard" does not mean it should be made by a judge. On the contrary, vesting policymaking authority in the judiciary-rather than the legislature-renders a representative government less accountable for the exercise of that a~t h o r i t y .~~ As a result, expanding the role of the judiciary to compensate for the perceived shortcomings of " p l u r a l i~m "~~ and the political process may only further stultify the ability of our representative democracy to deal with crisis.g7
The third risk an expansive judicial role poses for government by "the People"" flows from the preceding point: 94 . MILLER, supra note 7, at 269-70 (Judges "can make choices, hard for officers in the political branches, that cannot be avoided."). 96. MILLER, supra note 7, at 270-71.
97. E.g., Richardson, 418 U.S. at 188 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[Rlepeated and essentially head-on confrontations between the life-tenured branch and the representative branches of government will not, in the long run, be beneficial to either. The public confidence essential to the former and the vitality critical to the latter may well erode if we do not exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our power to negative the actions of the other branches."). As James Bradley Thayer described in his biography of John Marshall: [Tlhe exercise of [the judiciary's power of review], even when unavoidable, is always attended with a serious evil, namely, that the correction of legislative mistakes comes from the outside, and the people thus lose the political experience, and the moral education and stimulus that come from fighting the question out in the ordinary way, and correcting their own errors. . . . The tendency of a common and easy resort to this great function, now lamentably too common, is to dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility.
JAMES B. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106-07 (1901 judicial policymaking may prematurely (and unwisely) cut off policy debate. To the extent that an issue becomes constitutionalized, it is taken from the realm of public discourse. This may inhibit both the quality of the ultimate policy decision as well as necessary public support for that decision.
The quality of the ultimate lawmaking product is enhanced by leaving the relevant issues exposed to the legislative process and the public pressures that are brought to bear on that process.99 One of the fundamental postulates undergirding a free and open democratic society is that the search for truth is enhanced by permitting a full and uninhibited discussion of public questions.100 Necessarily, such a discussion is more effective if the ultimate resolution has not been removed from the realm of public debate and solution through constitutional adjudication. The best way to determine who is right and who is wrong on difficult social issues is to permit and encourage the opposing sides to exercise their persuasive efforts on state and national legislature^.'^^ Equally beneficial to the search for the optimal solution is the likelihood that, on any given issue, different legislatures will reach different results and the ensuing practical experience will cast further light on the underlying issues.lo2 This is the process by which a free, elected government works best.
Pretermitting democratic debate by constitutional adjudication, finally, may erode the public support that is vital to a secure democratic society. The Supreme Court purported to "end" the divisive social debate regarding abortion by deciding Roe u. Wade.lo3 But rather than "ending" the debate, Roe has engendered social unrest like that last seen during the 1960s' civil-rights and anti-war movements. That unrest, moreover, continues unabatedlo4-despite ongoing calls from the Court for the disputants to lay down their arms before a supposed constitutional concordat.lo5 Ironically, most other democratic nations-through the give-and-take of political (rather than judicial) debate-have adopted compromise positions that, while completely cheering neither "pro-choice" nor "pro-life" interests, have muted and largely ended the controversy that still rages in American streets.lo6 As the abortion debate illustrates, broad judicial intervention in the policy arena may well thwart the development of the consensus necessary to communal stability.lO ' The above concerns convince us that Justice White-by "decid[ing] cases and no m~re"'~~-got it right. Rather than a social diagnostician, he was an arbiter of public and private disputes who filled in policy gaps only as absolutely necessary. This gap-filling role, moreover, was undertaken not to satisfy overarching idiosyncratic goals, but to give incremental content to established constitutional and statutory policies. And while these achievements may be described as modest by some, they are hardly that. Dispassionate, impartial judging is absolutely essential to the proper functioning of our constitutional government. And few individuals have performed that role better than Byron R. White.
IV. CONCLUSION
At the inauguration of the tenth President of Brigham Young University, Justice White made the following remarks:
"[Olur leaders in the government and the private sectors . . . must not let the country be paralyzed by the clash of special interest groups that may seem unwilling to recognize what must necessarily be done, or indeed what must be tried, once such a course becomes reasonably clear."log We believe that the above observation is the ultimate answer to critics who charge that Byron White lacks greatness or constitutional vision. \He has not been paralyzed by the "clash of special interest groups"; instead, he has had the courage-in the course of deciding individual cases-to do "what must necessarily be done, or indeed what must be tried," once that course became "reasonably clear."
As Leon Friedman once wrote, Justice White "approaches each case without preconceived ideas and with a desire to examine the individual problem in that case rather than deducting the result from set principles. His approach makes his work more difficult to analyze but it makes for greater justice in the cases coming before our highest C~urt.""~ No grander claim to greatness or to constitutional vision could be made by any person who has served on the United States Supreme Court.
110. Friedman, supra note 2, at 356. We would add that this approach makes his work not only "more difficult to analyze" but also more difficult to perform because it requires greater effort.
